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Abstract 
Among the misunderstandings that are constantly fueling the debate on Europe, is its collective inability 
to shape the global game. And this at the moment when it faces American nationalism, Russian 
revisionism and China’s rise. To explain this lack of European reactivity there is a simple and common 
interpretation: European states are cruelly divided on all subjects and struggle to act collectively. But, 
this explanation confuses causes and consequences. The bottom line is that the European project born 
in 1957 was built against the idea of power. The whole question, is then to assess the capacity of Europe 
to reverse that trend and play power politics in taking into consideration the feeling of strategic 
loneliness in a less and less Kantian world (I) and the sense of danger in a more and more Hobbesian 
world (II).This is what we call a gaullian moment for Europe. 
Keywords 
China, European Union, France, Gaullian, Gaullist, Germany, Power, Power politics, Trump, United 
States. 
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“The Trump administration has achieved the extraordinary feat of turning the Germans into gaullists” 
New York Times February 18th 2019 
Introduction 
Among the misunderstandings that are constantly fueling the debate on Europe, is its collective inability 
to shape the global game. And this at the moment when she faces head-on, an unprecedented American 
nationalism reducing its allies to bulky objects, a Russian revisionism whose creativity targets the 
destruction of the liberal world and its institutions, and a China determined to hasten the step towards 
the roof of the world without excessive regard for those who would like to encourage it to slow down. 
To explain this lack of European reactivity there is a simple and common interpretation: European states 
are cruelly divided on all subjects and struggle to act collectively. By this yardstick, the orderly retreat 
towards the secure values of the nation-state would be preferable to the exhausting pursuit of a European 
project on the Sisyphean path. Yet, convenient as it is, this explanation confuses causes and 
consequences. Because the bottom of the case is not there. The bottom line is that the European project 
born in 1957 was built against the idea of power. The whole question, this article addresses, is to assess 
the capacity of Europe to reverse that trend and play power politics in taking into consideration the 
feeling of strategic loneliness in a less and less Kantian world (I) and the emergence of the sense of 
danger in a more and more Hobbesian world (II). 
Europe was constructed against power politics 
The European project launched in 1957 was fundamentally an anti-schmittian project1. The Treaty of 
Rome, signed a year after the Suez debacle, expressed the burial of the pretorian ambitions of Europe in 
favor of a forgetful intra-market version of the world. And basically nothing better explains this shift 
that this essential anecdote reported by Christian Pineau French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time 
of the case of Suez. At the invitation of Guy Mollet, hesitating to give in to the Soviet-American 
ultimatum to withdraw from Egypt, Adenauer had this to say: "In your place, I would accept. It's 
wisdom. And now we have to make Europe."2 Of course, Suez does not explain the Treaty of Rome. 
The European machine was launched in 1950 with the Schuman declaration3. But the context is that 
one. Europe, full of conquests with dubious profits, brings the colors of its power back to half-mast. It 
completely balances its global claims in favor of an exercise in which it has historically excelled: the 
practice of soft commerce guaranteed by law. It accepts all the more willingly in the cold war it enjoys 
an anti-American guarantee that protects Europe while framing the rearmament of Germany, 
rearmament that the failure of the EDC had hardly reached prevent. Let's leave the big problems of the 
world bigger than us ... the Europeans seem to be saying4. All for the common market. Nothing for the 
rest that remains in the hands of the States or the American protector. 
The only deviation from this intraversion was trade policy, communitarized since 1957, and which 
remains to this day the most powerful and effective source of leverage for the European Union at the 
global stage . But at this time the trade hardly had the political status it has acquired since then. European 
commercial interests were aligned. And the global trading game was limited to a tariff bargain between 
Europe and the United States. 
                                                     
1 Carl Schmitt defined politics as a capacity to discriminate between friend and foe.The European project was anti schmittian 
in the sense that it never endorsed that idea and aimed at precisely at killing it.  
2 Van Middelaar, L. “Le passage à l’Europe: Histoire d’un commencement", Paris, Gallimard, 2012. 
3 Giacone, A., & Olivi, B. "L’Europe difficile: Histoire politique de la construction européenne", Paris. Gallimard, 2007, p. 
27. 
4 This perception was of course not shared by de Gaulle. But by confining Europe to the economy, he felt completely free to 
project French diplomatic power into the world after the end of the Algerian war.  
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In many ways this overall situation gives the impression of having hardly changed. Europe which is 
not a state and which will never be one continues to live on the fragile model of the confederation of 
nation states. Confederation where federated fragments (trade policy, single market, competition policy) 
coexist with fragments of sovereignty shared between Brussels and the Member States (a growing 
number of public policies) and fragments that remain nationalized as foreign policy, defense or 
migrations. But this tenacious and indisputable reality masks recent as well as sensitive inflections. 
The gaullian moment 
These all converge towards what could be called a Gaullian Europe. A Europe more Gaullian than 
Gaullist. The difference is far from semantic and deserves an explanation. Gaullism believed only in the 
States and did not envisage any organization of Europe apart from a strict intergovernmentalism. For 
him Europe was a political space in which France could enlarge its influence. This did not prevent de 
Gaulle from supporting the common market that he had initially denounced given the benefits that 
French agriculture quickly gained5. But de Gaulle understood better than anyone else, the extreme 
loneliness of the States and the fragility of alliances. This is why, unlike all the other European leaders, 
he did not believe inseparable the link between the Atlantic Alliance and the construction of Europe6. 
But where he failed was in his ability to convince Europeans that his plan for the continent was more 
than a process of enlarging French power. A conclusion shared by Michel Debré in 1971, not without 
second thoughts7. The Gaullist vision related to the stakes of the twenty-first century expresses 
something else. Rather, it refers to the need for Europe to become sovereign and powerful in the face of 
the return of power politics. But it envisages this essential change only through a growing sharing of 
sovereignty between the states, thus violating the Gaullist doctrine. To simplify, one would say that 
Gaullism would become incarnate today in the chevènementisme8 whereas the Gaullian vision would 
be found more in the Macronian vision of the sovereign Europe9. Indeed, France is now very much in 
favor of extending the qualified majority to taxation, foreign and security policy, which was in no way 
de Gaulle's position. Macron is therefore very Gaullian but not Gaullist. When we read his latest 
proposals on Europe, we are struck by the extent to which they are based on the creation of new 
institutions, such as the creation of a European Asylum and Immigration Agency10. This is not a Gaullist 
approach since, by increasing Europe's responsibilities, it aims to further communitarise European 
policies, be they migration, the economy or taxation11. We can therefore understand the Gaullian turn 
of Europe only by taking into account the inflections of the French position. Indeed, while De Gaulle 
refused any politicization of the European Commission that he wanted to reduce to a technical role, 
today France is trying instead to repolitise it. It expects from it more political control over the 
                                                     
5 Institut Charles de Gaulle. “De Gaulle et son siècle: Tome V", Paris, La documentation française, 1992, p. 69. 
6 Paul Gaul Spaak, one of the founding fathers of the Common Market, said of De Gaulle: "For ten years I have seen him as 
the most dangerous opponent of the two ideas for which I have fought for nearly a quarter of a century. the Atlantic Alliance 
and the "European" unity; Spaak, P. H. "Combat inachevés", Paris, Fayard, 1969, p. 169-170 and p. 164. 
7 By pointing out that General De Gaulle had played his part in building a European Europe, Michel Debré implicitly called 
for a sovereigntist retraction: "Europe 1971: two failures - two successes - two tests - two certainties", Revue de Défense 
Nationale, October 1971. 
8 In reference to Jean Pierre Chevènement the former french minister who symbolised the opposition to the Treaty of 
Maastricht and European integration. 
9 Élysée. Point d’étape de l’initiative de la Sorbonne, March 5, 2019. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2019/03/05/point-etape-initiative-de-la-sorbonne  
10 Macron, E. For European renewal, March 4, 2019. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/pour-une-
renaissance-europeenne.However, there is debate as to whether these institutions are community or intergovernmental. 
Probably a combination of both. 
11 Macron's fierce opposition to the Spitzenkandidaten process in the selection of the President of the Commission shows, 
however, that France remains very attached to the supremacy of the states in the European game.It remains also ambivalent 
on the necessity of cutting the link between banks and sovereign debt. 
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management of the euro zone and not a rigid implementation of the Maastricht criteria12. France is to a 
certain extent favorable to a partial federalisation of European economic policy, precisely to circumvent 
the German and Hanseatic obstacles, while Germany, historically reputed federalist, has become very 
intergovernmentalist. This is the reason why it wants to deprieve the Eurogroup (considered too 
political) of any power for the benefit of the European Stability Mechanism deliberately depoliticized 
and charged to implement the "rule"13. This illustrates what Karl Heinz Bohrer calls the German 
tendency to fetishize the law to the point of making it "a metaphase based on an absolute norm 
independent of reality and placed above politics"14. From this point of view, there is a reversal between 
France and Germany. France understood that governance by EU institutions was preferable to 
governance by rules alone. Institutions allow political discretion whereas rules applied in isolation and 
without political contextualization lead to a certain dogmatism. This was remarkably explained by ECB 
Governor Mario Draghi, a discrete but implacable critic of German economic policy: “the rules are 
generally static and require states to adhere to specific actions while the institutions prescribe goals. As 
a result, rules cannot be updated quickly when unforeseen situations arise while institutions can be 
dynamic and flexible”15.  
The discovery of loneliness 
At the heart of the Gaullist worldview and the long-standing dispute between France and its partners 
was the question of the transatlantic link. Certainly De Gaulle was very clearly in the Atlantic camp16. 
From 1959 he recalled that the USSR was at two stages of the Tour de France. Later, he very clearly 
supported Washington in the Cuban Missile Crisis. His successors have not been left behind. Mitterrand 
did not hesitate to support London in the Falklands war against Argentina. And in the midst of the 
euromissile crisis he declared that the missiles were in the East and that the pacifists in the West refusing 
then any moral or strategic equivalence between East and West. The difference between Paris and its 
partners lies less in the degree of attachment to the transatlantic links than in their significance. For 
France this link is essential whereas for its partners it remains existential. For Germany, the preservation 
of the Atlantic alliance and the European construction were only two sides of the same coin, to which 
France very clearly refused. The European federalist Paul Henry Spaak totally shared the German point 
of view17. So hardly had the ink of the Elysée Treaty dried up that the German Bundestag conditioned 
the ratification of the treaty by introducing a preamble reaffirming the primacy of the transatlantic link; 
as if to ensure that the Franco-German construction would not be to the detriment of the alliance with 
the United States. De Gaulle's furious reaction to this approach, confirms the reality of the dispute and 
the French thoughts. Still today the debate is not totally closed. In a rather violent and totally unexpected 
article the former German leader of the SPD Sigmar Gabriel reproaches the new Franco-German treaty 
of Aachen of 2019 to take the risk of distorting the link of Germany with the Atlantic alliance evoking 
                                                     
12 A perfect illustration of this reversal of the relation to politics and therefore of the role of the community institutions was 
given to us by the exchange of forums between the Dutch Minister of Finance at STEF BLOK. The political European 
Commission needs greater transparency to debunk the myth of Brussels as a faceless bureaucracy and the response of 
French Commissioner Pierre Moscovici stating that "The European Commission is political - it has no other choice", 
Financial Times, February 22, 2019 
13 Cf Auer, S. Merkel's Germany and the European Union: Between emergency and the rule of rules, Government and 
Opposition, 2019,1-19.  
14 Bohrer, K. H. "Projekt Kleinstaat", Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Europäisches Denken, 2011, 747, p. 661-669. 
15 Draghi, M. Sovereignty in a globalised world. Bank of International Settlement. February 22, 2019. 
https://www.bis.org/review/r190225g.pdf 
16 "Since the Atlantic Alliance did not exist, nothing could prevent the Soviet dictatorship from spreading all over Europe and 
Africa, and from there covering the whole world. Well ! France prefers to maintain the Atlantic Alliance until the day when 
the reign of peace would be really assured" de Gaulle cited in Duroselle, J. France and the United States from the beginning 
to the present day, Paris, Seuil, 1976, p. 226-227. 
17 Spaak, P. H. “Combats inachevés”, Paris, Fayard, 1969, p. 169-170. 
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the 1963 precedent18. Nothing new then? Not quite. Because the election of Donald Trump has precisely 
introduced a major break in the transatlantic relationship. And that his first victim is Germany. Strategic 
victim because Germany has basically never seriously imagined its future outside the US guarantee. 
And that contrary to what one might think this feeling was reinforced after the end of the cold war 
because Germany believed that rivalries between states in decline would benefit the logic of economic 
interdependence. More than anyone, Germany believed at the end of the story because it suited itself so 
much19. Yes, Germany was still surrounded, but this time it was by friends It has been since the end of 
the Cold War that German military expenditure has collapsed, making the Bundeswehr a second-rate 
army and very little operational20. Strategic victim, therefore. Economic victim then because the 
nationalism of Trump strikes an economy that lives on its exports and accumulates destabilizing 
surpluses elsewhere21. The German confusion with Trump is all the greater because the new American 
policy is not reducible to any traditional analysis scheme. Trump is not messianic in the sense that could 
be a George Bush who wanted to extend the field of democracy to the complicated East. He is not a 
realist in the Kissingerian sense of the term since it completely neglects the construction of alliances 
essential to the construction of a balance of power with his opponents. If to counter China Trump was a 
realist, he would have logically made an alliance with Europe to face it. Especially since on this question 
the European and American interests are perfectly aligned22. But his approach is completely different. 
Europe and Japan, for example, were the first to be hit by US tariff sanctions on aluminum steel, while 
the main target was China in principle. Incomprehensible from an economic or ideological point of view, 
this strategy becomes intelligible in Gaullist terms: the United States first strikes those who are most 
dependent on them strategically. All this explains why France, even if she is disconcerted by Trump's 
policy, is politically better equipped to face her23. For at bottom all Gaullian grammar rests on the idea 
that protections are never gratuitous and protectors often versatile.  
The discovery by Germany that the notion of allies no longer had for the United States the 
sacramental value it accorded it, constitutes for it a geopolitical shock; the most important since 
reunification. Germany, which has always thought that its economic prosperity was the best antidote to 
the world's disorder, is now in a situation where it finds that its power does not protect it from US 
pressure or China's competition. A situation she would have been unable to contemplate just ten years 
ago. The economic nationalism of Donald Trump is a shock for Germany that can grow if it decides to 
extend its protectionist policy to the European automotive sector with a goal to the key: to force the 
German companies extremely present on the market American to relocate all their production in the 
United States24. A shock all the more powerful that she does not see how to answer it, since Trump 
seems really decided to do without allies even if they came to be accommodating what would be the 
spontaneous tendency of the Germans. Despite being a strong Brexit supporter, the White House tenant 
has made it clear to the British that he would not give them any particular economic advantage in the 
                                                     
18 Gabriel, S. Franco-German friendship is not enough. Project Syndicate, January 25, 2019.; Laïdi, Z. The Franco-German 
pact is not the problem, Project Syndicate, February 2, 2019.  
19 Stelzenmüller, C. The unready hegemon, Berlin Policy Journal, February 27, 2019. https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-
unready-hegemon/  
20 Buck, T. German military: Combat ready?, Financial Times, February 2018.  
21 Dieter, H. Stubbornly Germany first: Options for reducing the world’s largest current account surplus. SWP Comment, 
2018, 48. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C48_dtr.pdf 
22 Laïdi, Z. Reading Olson to Understand Trump : Multipolarity without Multilateralism?, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies Policy Papers, 2018, 2. 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/57564/RSCAS_PP_2018_02.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y  
23 In addition, the United States is undeniably impressed by the military capabilities of France, particularly in Africa. The 
result is that the United States criticizes Germany and rarely France despite differences on most major issues. 
24 Dawson, C. & Boston, W. Auto makers consider shifting more manufacturing to North America. The Wall Street Journal, 
October 5, 2018. 
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prospect of a free trade agreement between the states. United States and the United Kingdom25. In other 
words, even when trying to please a less accommodating protector, the most faithful of allies is now 
assured of nothing. 
The German confusion is all the greater, because of the uncertainty of the American strategic 
guarantee guarantees to an ideological opposition to the very idea of the European Union. Not enough 
to transfer their sovereignty to Brussels, the European advisor for the security of Donald Trump that is 
John Bolton26. The relationship to sovereignty is at the heart of the Euro-American dispute. But the idea 
of shared sovereignty is deeply foreign to the United States. 
At first, Europeans confronted with the brutality of Trump behaved as "an abused woman having to 
leave the marital home". But the hope of an American appeasement to the test of power has not come. 
On the contrary, American policy has continued to be radicalized. Most US officials in favor of a strong 
relationship with Europe left the White House. The United States announced: their withdrawal from, the 
Paris agreement on climate, the nuclear agreement with Iran, the Soviet-American agreement on 
intermediate range nuclear weapons (INF). They have also suggested that the US strategic guarantee 
cannot be preserved if the Europeans continue to look east; announced their unilateral withdrawal from 
Syria to the point of uncovering the French special forces, engaged in a commercial offensive against 
the European interests, triggered a process of suffocation of the WTO institution absolutely fundamental 
for Europe in trade27. In this context, even Germany, which has a dual wait and see tradition, is obliged 
to note that the carpet of certainties is shrinking under its feet: "an alliance which becomes unilateral 
and transactional is no longer an alliance" declares a German official28. That is the problem. Merkel, for 
her part, felt that Europe must now take its destinies in her own hands. Even the Dutch Prime Minister, 
who was not naturally expected on this ground, recently declared that "Realpolitik must be an essential 
part of Europe’s foreign policy tool kit. Because if we only preach the merits of principles and shy away 
from exercising power in the geopolitical arena, our continent may always be right, but it will seldom 
be relevant."29 In fact, even if they remain cautious, European reactions to the American offensive are 
not insignificant. On the commercial side Europe exercised its right of retaliation against the rise of the 
American tariffs. In addition, it has put on the table a reform agenda of the WTO that cleverly takes into 
account the American grievances against China, complaints that it also shares very widely. 
She was very forthcoming on the establishment with France and Great Britain of a trade barter 
instrument with Iran to allow European companies not trading with the United States not to be affected 
by the extraterritoriality of American laws30. The three European powers are also on the same line to 
refuse to withdraw from the agreement with Iran as desired by the United States. It is even three powers 
have recently refused to yield to US pressures that gave them the injunction to cease all business 
                                                     
25 Politi, J. Is the Lighthizer brigade about to charge through London?, Financial Times, March 4, 2019. 
26 Bolton, J. R. Should we take global governance seriously, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2000, p. 220. 
27 The United States is blocking the renewal of the WTO appeals judges in order to make its function impossible from 2020 
onwards. In doing so, the WTO partners will no longer go along with what is the American objective. Washington wants 
to return to the GATT system, where scouts are leading to bilateral negotiations. 
28 Erlanger, S. & Bennhold, K. Rift between Trump and Europe is now open and angry, The New York Times, February 17, 
2019. 
29 Rutte, M. The EU: From the power of principles towards principles and power, February 13, 2019. 
https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2019/02/13/churchill-lecture-by-prime-minister-mark-rutte-europa-
institut-at-the-university-of-zurich 
30 International interbank exchanges are all governed by SWIFT which is a basic institution based in Brussels. The United 
States has asked Swift to freeze any deal with Iran even if it does not concern the United States! To deal with Iran, the 
Europeans have decided to circumvent Swift by creating Instex. Instex works like a central clearing house. Buyers and 
sellers in Iran and Europe could get their money without making transfers into and out of the Middle East country .But this 
device can only concern companies that have no connection with the United States. The big European companies for whom 
the US market is vital have all left Iran. It remains then to be seen if even such a modest instrument is effective.Financial 
Times , january 31st, 2019 
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relationship with the Chinese firm Huawei. This latter choice may seem contradictory to the growing 
distrust of Europeans towards China. But this contradiction is only apparent. Europeans believe that it 
is possible to work with Huawei, as long as certain precautions have been taken31. Finally, again recently 
Germany and France have very clearly refused to send ships to the Black Sea to provoke the Russians 
following US injunctions32. While urging the EU to increase its military expenditures it warned it against 
any defense policy that may limit the access to the European market for US firms33 It is therefore not 
correct to say or think that Europe is doing nothing. This new strategic situation in fact favors the 
rapprochement of French and German visions on the world order even if approximation does not mean 
identity of views. This convergence around an idea of a politically more autonomous Europe organized 
around the Franco-German couple makes all the more sense that essentially it is basically Germany that 
converts to a certain French vision. But it must not overshadow the evolution of French thought 
especially with regard to Russia. With this one, the relations of France are very clearly degraded and 
this for reasons which are due to the power of the Russian disinformation which does not spare any 
France, to the Russian support to the nationalist forces, to the Russian return in Africa and in particular 
in Central African Republic, the difficulty of finding common grounds with Moscow on the Syrian issue. 
Moscow can only welcome the distancing of the link between Europe and the United States. But it 
aspires to benefit from it by dividing it. Basically, Washington and Moscow are betting on the 
destruction of the European Union. China is not there yet because it needs the single market. But the 
division of the Member States is at the heart of its European strategy. We can however consider that the 
three big hard powers in the world have a joint interest in refusing the emergence of the EU as a full 
fledged actor. 
Even if it is not directly related to this new global strategic situation, the decision of Germany to 
build a fighter jet with France due in 2040, and this against the advice of the German General Staff who 
would have preferred to buy the American F 35, has a significant political significance34. It is therefore 
not correct to conclude too quickly that Europe is doing nothing in front of American, Chinese or 
Russian pressure. It remains to move from a purely defensive strategy to a collective approach where 
Europe would be able not only to indicate what it refuses but to affirm what it wants. But this second 
step is undeniably more difficult to achieve than the first. The conversion of Germany to power politics 
will at best be very slow because the German political metabolism is a slow metabolism. By slow 
metabolism is meant an extremely gradualist initiation of the collective process of redefining the relation 
to the world. This is due largely to German political history since 1945, to its consensual and 
fundamentally democratic decentralized political system. The gap with France is on this point 
considerable35. But there is more. To participate in the formalization of European sovereignty, Germany 
must relearn how to live with ideas of concepts that it has powerfully repressed, but which are 
paradoxically all concepts of German origin: Weltpolitik, Realpolitik, Machtpolitik, Weltpolitikfähigkeit. 
For that it would be necessary that all this debate extends beyond the official circles to reach the whole 
of the German public opinion. For the moment she is very far from it even if she is not blind to the 
current change36. In addition, there are beliefs and processes throughout the German model that go 
against all forms of global thinking. If we look quickly at the ordoliberal doctrine that still structures 
                                                     
31 The Economist, February 2&, 2019. 
32 Donahue, P. & Jacobs, J. Pence asked Merkel to provoke Russia by sending warships to Crimea, Bloomberg, March 29, 
2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-07/merkel-is-said-to-reject-u-s-pressure-to-provoke-russia-s-
navy 
33 Besch, S and Quencez, M, “The importance of being protectionist: a long view of the european defense fund “, War On the 
Rocks , June 13 ,2019 
34 Buck, T. Germany opts against buying American F-35 stealth fighter, Financial Times, January 31, 2019. 
35 Major, C. & Mölling, C. Franco-German differences over defense make Europe vulnerable, Carnegie Europe, March 29, 
2018. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75937  
36 Körbinger Stiftung. The Berlin Pulse: German foreign policy in perspective, 2018. https://www.koerber-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2018/The-Berlin-Pulse-2018.pdf  
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German economic thought today, we are struck by the extent to which it is foreign to any idea of 
macroeconomics for example. If Germany still refuses the idea of a euro area budget that would revive 
the European economy in the event of an economic slowdown it is obviously because of what Germany 
wants avoid being the payer37. But fundamentally there is beyond that, the idea that the European 
economy is the sum of national economies that must first and foremost be well managed. What would 
have one day made Mario Draghi say that German economic philosophy was a branch of moral 
philosophy ... This profoundly anti-Keynesian view explains why Germany refuses to admit that its own 
choices can affect others, including negatively: “The German government likes to point out to critics 
that it is not in a position to influence the level of surpluses.” To the question of how Germany intends 
to absorb its huge trade surpluses, which clearly have a negative effect on the growth of other European 
countries, the German Government replies that the latter has no authority over the companies. “This is 
simply incorrect because the state has a direct influence on current account and capital account 
balances.”38. 
When Germany is criticized for engaging in a gas pipeline project with Russia that undermines 
European energy solidarity and strengthens Russia's market power over Europe, these same German 
leaders argue the same arguments.39 Naturally, this advocacy is very largely instrumentalized by the 
political power to justify its choices. But interests are related to beliefs, making it very difficult or at 
least very slow to change the relationship with the world. 
Another area where German choices impede the political emancipation of Europe is that of money. 
Certainly, the euro is by far the second largest currency in the world in terms of the six criteria that 
characterize the role of an international currency40. But on four of these six criteria the euro is very much 
behind the dollar. Moreover, this gap has widened in recent years following the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The absence of a safe European asset (safe asset) has reduced the attractiveness of the euro 
for foreign investors41. But the creation of such an asset is central on the debate on the reform of the 
euro area even if there is no consensus on this point. Germany but also the countries of the Hanseatic 
League are reluctant to move toward a stronger monetary union as long as the link between sovereign 
debts and banks is not severed. This could be achieved by limiting how much domestic sovereign debt 
banks can hold42 .The arbitration between solidarity and responsibility within the euro zone is therefore 
far from being decided and not only by the fault of the Germans43. But as long as this point is not settled, 
that is to say until a true banking union has been established the emergence of the euro as a competitor 
of the dollar will remain very unlikely. Especially since the setting up of a safe asset adds another stake: 
the existence of deep and liquid European capital markets, i.e. financial markets fully integrated into the 
image of what they can be in the United States. Finally, we must add to this third obstacle which is 
                                                     
37 This is actually a myth. Germany did not pay anything at all. It lent Greece money at non-concessional rates, the first 
function of which was to repay the German banks. 
38 Dieter, H. Stubbornly Germany first: Options for reducing the world’s largest current account surplus. SWP Comment, 
2018, 48. p.5. Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C48_dtr.pdf 
39 Benner, T. Enough Babble, Berlin Policy Journal, February 27, 2019. https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/enough-babble/  
40 These six criteria are: the global volume of debt denominated in one currency (22% for the euro against 63% for the dollar), 
the currency of international loans (21% for the euro against 59 for the dollar), the use of a currency in the foreign exchange 
markets (31% for the euro against 42% for the dollar), the currency of payments of the exchanges (31% for the euro 42 for 
the dollar) finally the wording of the foreign exchange reserves (20% for the euro against 64 for the dollar) ECB, The 
international role of the euro, July 2017. On the link between euro area reform and the international role of the euro: cf 
Münchau, W. Tinkering will not deliver a stronger role for the euro, Financial Times, August 26, 2018. 
41 Münchau, W. Tinkering will not deliver a stronger role for the euro, Financial Times, August 26, 2018. 
42 Bénassy-Quéré, A., Brunnermeier, M., Enderlein, H., Farhi, E., Fratzscher, M., Fuest, C., Gourinchas, P.-O., Pisani-Ferry, 
J., Rey, H., Schnabel, I., Véron, N., Weder di Mauro, B., Zettelmeyer, J. Euro area architecture: What reforms are still 
needed, and why, VOX CEPR Policy Portal, May 2, 2019. https://voxeu.org/article/euro-area-architecture-what-reforms-
are-still-needed-and-why  
43 Italy is oppoosed to that idea and France is ambivalent on that. Discussion with Nicolas Veron, May 2019 
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strictly political in nature. A large international currency can only truly exist only if backed by a strong 
political power. We are from that. But the simple fact that this debate is resurging in Europe today 
reveals the need for Europe to think of its strategic solitude. 
A sense of danger 
Despite this, a feeling that is gradually emerging in Europe. This is the meaning of danger, that is to say 
the feeling of vulnerability coming from both an ally that was believed to be unfailing, from an old 
adversary that was thought to have been neutralized (Russia), from an immense country that we did not 
see coming so quickly (China). In 2003, the first report on the European Security Strategy, drafted with 
difficulty, began with a flourish: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free"44. 
Admittedly nobody could in 2003 project themselves into the world 2019. But what strikes in this report 
is the deep belief in an increasingly interdependent world where the use of force would inevitably decline 
because of the decline of conflicts between States. The message that Europe is sending to the world is 
that of an actor full of goodwill, willing to use the levers of negotiation, dialogue and development aid 
to appease the suffering of the world. All on the backdrop of confusing liberal optimism: “Spreading 
good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, 
establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the 
international order”45. The civil power is thus theorized and Europe proposes to provide 
leadership46.Europe proposes then to lead by example. But the illusion does not last long. The reversal 
took place in 2008 in favor of the Copenhagen climate conference. Europe, which had contributed to 
the success of the Kyoto Protocol, has been brutally dispossessed of its climate leadership. The United 
States and China do not agree on anything. But they are not on an essential point: the climate is a question 
too serious not to be taken back in hand by the big powers. In fact, Europe dazed is excluded from the 
drafting of the final communiqué47. The United States and China decide from there to change the 
parameters of the negotiation. They must be based on commitments made by States to reach a global 
agreement and not define global parameters that would then be imposed on States48. Technically we go 
from top down to bottom up. Politically, Europe is being deprived of the power to impose high standards 
on the rest of the world49. It is also the modification of the parameters of the negotiation and the Sino-
US pre-agreement on the climate that will allow the success of the Paris conference in 201550. This is 
the beginning of a process of rupture of multilateralism by the great powers. But this signal was not the 
only one. In the same year, the Doha Round negotiations at the WTO, strongly pushed by the European 
                                                     
44 European Union. European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world, Council of the European Union, 2003. 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/european_security_strategy_a_secure_europe_in_a_better_world_brussels_12_december_20
03-en-1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b.html 
45 idem 
46 Groen, L. On the road to Paris: How can the EU avoid failure at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 21)?, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali, 2015. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1533.pdf 
47 Schreurs, M. The Paris Climate Agreement and the three largest emitters: China, the United States, and the European Union, 
Politics and Governance, 2016, Vol. 4(3), p. 219-223. 
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/666/666 
48 Laïdi, Z. Towards a post-hegemonic world: The multipolar threat to the multilateral order, International Politics, 2010, 
Vol. 51(3), p. 350-365. http://www.laidi.com/sitedp/sites/default/files/IP_Towards%20a%20Post-
Hegemonic%20World.pdf 
49 It must be understood, however, that this dispossession is due to objective factors. At the time of the Kyoto Protocol Europe 
was with the United States the first emitter of greenhouse gases. Since its weight has been reduced considerably for 
demographic reasons and a generally virtuous policy 
50 Tiberghien, Y. Chinese Global Climate Change Leadership and Its Impact, in Amighini, A. China: Champion of 
Which Globalization?, Milan: Ledizioni LediPublishing (ISPI). May 2018. Pp. 101-120. 
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Union, were shattered by a political disagreement between the United States and India this time. It is the 
end of the great commercial masses and the beginning of the process of disruption of the trading system. 
This gradual return to classical geopolitics was amplified by the financial crisis and its corollary: the 
euro crisis. The financial crisis revealed the rise of emerging countries, especially China, while the crisis 
of the euro plunged Europe into introversion. Initially a symbol of risk aversion Europe based on risk 
became for the first time a systemic risk for the rest of the world51. When in 2015 it emerges from the 
crisis that struck it, Europe discovers a profoundly changed world. She meets a Russia on the war foot 
in Ukraine and a China launched at full speed towards the top of the world. By 2010, the Chinese GNP 
crosses that of Europe before exceeding it. In 2035 China will account for 22% of the world GNP against 
14% for the United States 12% for Europe at parity with India52. The sense of danger will therefore 
come first from the rise of China. It explains the Gaullist turn of Europe. A turning point made possible 
by the change of German foot. The signals had not missed. In 2012 a French Commissioner, Michel 
Barnier, had already proposed to ban access to the European market to all foreign companies coming 
from countries not accepting the principle of reciprocity in the award of public contracts which was 
obviously already the case of China. The common-sense proposal is buried by Berlin53. Behind its 
ideological commitment to free trade, Germany was actually defending very prosaic interests. Because 
its industrial products are very much in demand in China, it generates considerable margins on the 
Chinese market, a market on which it reigns supreme among its European competitors. In 2016 the 
Commission came back with a more watered down proposal. But Germany said once again no. Yet the 
following year, Germany abruptly reversed its position. China's takeover of Kuka, a global pioneer in 
the manufacture of industrial robots, shows Germany the flip side of Chinese décor54. The Chinese 
market economy is a pasteboard decor behind which is emerging a global takeover strategy that uses all 
the liberalities of the Western system to lead the race. But for China the German industrial model is the 
absolute reference. More than the United States. Because if for China the United States is a rival, Europe 
is a prey. Industrial prey with two advantages: to have both a single market and divided states in all non-
communitarized areas. It is therefore enough for him to find a door badly closed (Greece, Portugal) or 
deliberately opened (Italy) to access the European house55. This is exactly what it did with the purchase 
of the ports of Piraeus and Lisbon. This is what it does with the Balkan countries, before they join the 
European Union, or even more recently with Italy, with which it has just signed the first G7 MOU under 
the BRI56. A priori investing in rail or telephone road infrastructures is not reprehensible or worrying. 
But there are several problems57. The first is that China has financial resources to buy and lend. Except 
that in the latter case, it places its partners in a situation of financial dependence which deliberately 
ignores the most basic prudential factors. Thus, if the recipient is unable to repay, China will 
                                                     
51 Laïdi, Z. Europe as a risk averse power: A hypothesis. Sciences Po, 2014. https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-
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52 European Parliamentary Research Service. Global Trends to 2035: Economy and Society, 2018. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627126/EPRS_STU(2018)627126_EN.pdf  
53 Financial Times, March 19, 2019. 
54 The Federation of German Industries (BDI). Partner and Systemic Competitor – How do we deal with China’s State-
Controlled Economy?, BDI Policy Paper, January 2019. 
https://english.bdi.eu/media/publications/#/publication/news/china-partner-and-systemic-competitor  
55 Poggetti, L. Italy’s BRI blunder, Project Syndicate, March 21, 2019. 
56 Haenle, P. & Le Corre, P. Xi’s visit to Europe and China as a “systemic rival”, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global 
Policy, March 18, 2019. https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/03/18/xi-s-visit-to-europe-and-china-as-systemic-rival-pub-
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57 Stolton, S. & Fortuna, G. Leaked memo reveals China’s detailed plans in Italy, Euroactiv, March 8, 2019. 
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opportunistically purchase the property for which a loan was granted58. Hence the Chinese interest for 
small European countries like Portugal Greece. The second is that agreements with states are negotiated 
in complete opacity. China is not moving towards convergence with the West. Quite the contrary since 
the arrival of Xi Ji Ping she has very officially unveiled her ambitions and expressed her willingness to 
see the party take greater control over the economy not to mention the official obligation for companies 
to cooperate with the State and intelligence services59. For Europe the challenge is not only economic 
but ideological. It has to confront itself more and more with an increasingly illiberal world of which she 
had not foreseen the emergence. In its defence, the United States has fed the same illusion. However, 
we cannot say that Europe remains unresponsive. Indeed, within a year it has taken on a community or 
national basis important decisions. The first is the establishment of a European mechanism for 
controlling foreign investment in strategic sectors60. Of course, the ultimate responsibility for accepting 
these investments remains in the hands of the Member States. But the vast majority of these now have 
national control mechanisms. And the main one of them, Germany has revised this mechanism three 
times61. Moreover, and for the first time in its history since 1945, Germany recaptured the very French 
idea of industrial policy hitherto considered as an anti market idea, even if that change has more to do 
with the Chinese threat than the French persuasion62. This document goes as far as to foresee the 
possibility for the German State to take provisional control of strategic enterprises likely to fall into 
foreign hands63. And as if to confirm this absolutely fundamental reorientation, France and Germany 
have just signed a Manifesto Franco-German for an industrial policy adapted to the 21st century64. This 
document, unthinkable two years ago, proposes to redefine European competition policy, including 
through the establishment of a possible right of appeal by States against Commission decisions65. 
Finally, this same Commission is considering in the very near future to put in place new rules on the 
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award of public contracts to contain China in the practices are judged to be at least unfair66. For the 
European Union, China is now considered a "systemic rival"67. It does not seem like anything. But by 
introducing for the first time the idea of rival the European Union is part of a schmittian logic that defines 
politics as the ability to discriminate the friend of the enemy. It may mark the exit of a sort of political 
provincialism, France has been almost alone in criticizing. If this trend were confirmed, it would show 
that the European Union is finally starting to play politics. Should we believe it? Yes. Can we believe 
it? Perhaps. 
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